The Scientific Worldview: Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 11a The Ten Assumptions of Science: Relativism
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2014
{The discussion below is mostly about defining a “thing.” Maybe I can help, so we can all be on the same page.
Granted in infinite space and time terms nothing exists in a static state. But in human terms we can say things are 1) Real, or 2) Abstract, and given a need to communicate we allow that a “thing” can be defined real or abstract and, most importantly, 3) that we allow ourselves to refer to most “things” as something that encompasses a time span. So, we may live 80 years or so as “thing” or a virtual photon can exist for an infinitesimal duration. It is still a “thing.”
3) refers to the time duration of things, the only way we can observe some of them. Since we can’t freeze the universal energy to any time duration, or absolute state, we can only abstractly, in some way, consider that infinitesimal state, to be a thing, even if abstractly so.}
Critique of "The Scientific Worldview": Part 11a The Ten Assumptions of Science: Relativism
Bill throws in a bit of absolutism to stir the pot and keep his own assumptions consupponible.
I am ever so grateful to Bill Westmiller, whose comments are marked "BW: ". The quotes marked TSW are from "The Scientific Worldview[1]" and my comments are marked "[GB: ".
TSW: Ninth Assumption of Science, relativism (Part 1 of 3)
“All things have characteristics that make them similar to all other things as well as characteristics that make them dissimilar to all other things.”
BW: ... an assumption depending on the definition of "things". I know a lot of dictionaries simply define "thing" as any material object, but I prefer the broader definition from Merriam-Webster, which encompasses events, acts, situations, and qualities as "things":
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/thing
For clarity, I'll assume (you don't say) that your "things" are only "material objects", in contrast with my "things" as any object or condition amenable to abstraction. This presumptive "attitude" is just "my thing".
[GB: Right. For the univironmental determinist, “things” always have xyz dimensions and location with respect to other things. True to the indeterministic approach of Merriam-Webster and the religious culture in general, your definition of “thing” objectifies motions (events and acts) in the same way Einstein did in his most important philosophical error.[1]]
BW: So ... it is true that all *material objects* are similar to all other things that have matter. It is also true that all material objects have position, motion, and environments that are dissimilar from all other material objects. Therefore, for Borchardt Things, your statement is true.
[GB: Glad to see that you agree.]
BW: However, for Westmiller Things, it isn't necessarily true. Gravity is not "similar to" any other things. Mass in any one thing is not "dissimilar" to mass in all other things. Electrons have characteristics that are not "dissimilar" to other electrons, although electrons are "dissimilar" to all things that are not electrons.
[GB: Sorry, Bill, but gravity is not a thing. It is a motion. If you think it is a thing, please give me some of it so I can use it to hammer my next nail without exerting any effort. Similarly, mass is not a thing. Mass is a measurement of a thing’s resistance to acceleration. As in the case of snowflakes, which we can see, we may assume that no two electrons, which we cannot see, are identical. Like other idealists, you have only imagined them to be so. Whenever we compare any two snowflakes in detail, we find that they have dissimilarities as well as similarities. If we could do that for electrons, we would get a similar result. When the dissimilarities among microcosms become great enough, we consider them to be members of a different class. The transition from one class to another is never as distinct as indeterminists imagine. That is the essence of relativism. There are always some similarities between microcosms.]
TSW: "The Law of Identity or Equality, A = A, that is, every concept is equal to itself."
BW: That's not the usual meaning. It isn't that concepts are equal, but that a "thing" is what it is. It can't be an Apple and a Non-Apple at the same time. This is a statement about nature, dictated by logic, not consciousness. Granted, we use concepts to refer to "things", but that just requires that our definitions of terms be rational and consistent with reality. E.g.: You can't have nothing that is something.
[GB: Remember that the quote above was written by an absolutist. The other end of that continuum is the Law of Inequality, A / A. The reality is, as in the empty space-solid matter idealization, always in between. Because all matter is always in motion, no single thing is equal to itself for even a microsecond. As you recognize, the apple that you speak of will not always remain an apple. Eventually it will rot, becoming a “non-apple” part of the soil that engulfed it. Absolutists, such as yourself, tend to think of things as being static. That kind of “reality” does not and cannot exist.]
TSW: "There are no strict identities because all matter is in constant motion; no thing can be what it was just a moment before."
BW: There's a difference between identity and position. A Borchardt Thing doesn't cease to be what it is, simply because it's position, relative to other things, has changed. Since all translational motion is relative, we can't even say that a thing has moved. Maybe it's just the other things that are moving. Your formulation suggests that a Borchardt Thing becomes *something else*, or nothing else, because other things are moving.
[GB: Bill, look at it this way: All microcosms (Borchardt Things, as you say) are composed of submicrocosms and exist in a sea of supermicrocosms, all of which are in motion. There is a continuous exchange of matter and the motion of matter between the microcosm and its macrocosm. Thus, a person, for example, continually breathes in and out, exchanging carbon dioxide for oxygen, losing hair, and gaining or losing weight with every microsecond. This occurs even for operationalists who think that they are not moving with respect to anything else just because they cannot measure it.]
BW: IF you're considering the Westmiller Thing called "motion" to be a *characteristic* of the Borchardt Thing called "object", then nothing ever has any identity at all. One second, an Apple is an Apple, but the next millisecond (due to the rotation of the earth) it is something else. That's a VERY strange way to view Borchardt Things.
[GB: Huh? Motion is not a thing.]
TSW: "Absolutism is consupponible with certainty and that bulwark of classical mechanism, the notion of finite universal causality."
BW: I understand your intent, but I think you're just defining terms in such a way as to make them appear to be logically coherent (consupponible). For example, it isn't "absolutism" to assert that a Borchardt Thing retains its identity, irrespective of its relative motion. It might be "absolutism" to say that an Apple is forever an Apple, even after it rots and disintegrates into a pile of chemical compounds.
[GB: Right. I use no definitions or assumptions that are not consupponible. And, as I just explained, it is indeed “absolutism” to assert an identity for a real object at any time. Such claims are of a piece with Plato’s ideal objects, which could exist nowhere except in his head. The removal of every little bit of absolutism is a critical component of univironmental determinism and its reduction, neomechanics. When you get to neomechanics, you will see that I was careful not to draw the abstract microcosms as spheres. The irregularities in a microcosmic boundary imply that the microcosm has parts, submicrocosms capable of semi-independent motion, reflecting the observation that no microcosm retains perfect identity for even a nanosecond. The perfect identities of the absolutist are not necessary for an apple to be good enough to be called an apple for a long time.]
TSW: "Only if an object could be described completely by a finite number of unchanging characteristics could it be absolutely identical to another object with the same description."
BW: The logically coherent interpretation of this sentence is that no Borchardt Thing can ever be described. Nothing has any identity unless every Westmiller Thing about it remains static. The conclusion has to be that we can never know anything about reality, even if what we assert is an unmitigated truth. If that's the case, why even bother to make the effort of putting one word after another in an effort to describe reality, or relativity, or infinity?
[GB: Now, now, Bill, do not get discouraged. I am sorry that the infinite universe did not turn out as perfect or absolute as you had hoped. Remember the Third Assumption of Science, uncertainty, (It is impossible to know everything about anything, but it is possible to know more about anything.) We can make wonderful descriptions about things in spite of those things having infinite qualities and existing in an infinite macrocosm. Many of these descriptions will even hold up long enough to be published. Those of us who have examined the real world continually find endless detail. The mathematically inclined and others who think they have discovered an identity invariably have not done their homework. Upon closer examination, each portion of the universe reveals its infinite variety.]
Next: Relativism (Part 2 of 3)
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